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Abstract 
This study begins by examining the origins of the fair balance principle. There follows 
an analysis of the application of the principle across a range of rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the European Convention. The functions performed by the fair balance 
principle, together with the factors assessed by the Court when utilising the principle 
are distilled from the case-law. Conclusions are drawn as to the  relationship between 
the fair balance principle and  the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
 
The principle of fair balance1 is ubiquitous in the case-law of both the original and full-
time European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the Court).2 Indeed, according to the 
former, “...inherent in the whole of the Convention3 is a search for a fair balance 
                                           
1 It was so described by the Grand Chamber in Hutten-Czapsk v Poland, Judgment of 19 
June 2006, 45 EHRR 4, heading to para. 167. 
2 A search of the Court’s HUDOC database produces 100+ references to the principle: 
available from www.echr.coe.int. 
3 The European Convention on Human Rights. 
2 
 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”4 A Grand Chamber of the current 
Court has explicitly endorsed that view.5 Yet some of the most esteemed commentators 
on the Convention have observed, “[h]owever, the very notion of fair balance is obscure 
and amenable to a varying margin of appreciation...”6 Therefore, we shall seek to 
discover the origins of, and functions performed, by this principle. That will involve 
examining the range of Articles under which it has been applied and the factors 
considered by the Court when utilising the principle. It will be important to ascertain 
what competing interests the Court identifies when undertaking the balancing process. 
Additionally, it will be illuminating to determine if there are links between the fair 
balance principle and other general concepts enshrined in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
The Foundations of the Fair Balance Principle 
In the very earliest case-law the original Court found an implied principle of “just 
balance” within the Convention. 
“The Court considers that the general aim set for themselves by the Contracting 
Parties through the medium of the European Convention on Human Rights, was to 
provide effective protection of fundamental human rights, and this, without doubt 
not only because of the historical context in which the Convention was concluded, 
but also of the social and technical developments in our age which offer to States 
considerable possibilities for regulating the exercise of these rights.  The 
Convention therefore implies a just balance between the protection of the general 
interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental human rights while 
attaching particular importance to the latter.”7 
                                           
4 Soering v UK, A.161 (1989), 11 EHRR 439, at para. 89. 
5 N. v UK, Judgment of 27 May 2008, 47 EHRR 39, at para. 44. 
6 P. van Dijk , F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn & L. Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the 
ECHR, 4th ed. (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006) p. 349. 
7 Case “Relating to Certain Aspects Of The Laws On The Use of Languages In Education 
In Belgium” v Belgium (Merits) A.6 (1968), 1 EHRR 252, generally referred to as the 
“Belgian Linguistic” case, at para. B.5. 
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So the basis of the principle was not the text of the particular Articles being litigated, 
prohibition of discrimination8 in combination with the right to education9, but a basic 
requirement that member States achieve an appropriate equilibrium in safeguarding the 
well-being of their populations whilst protecting the fundamental rights of individuals 
against a background of rapid social, e.g. gender equality10, and technological, e.g. 
interception of communications11, evolution. However, Judge Terje Wold categorically 
opposed the approach of the Plenary Court’s majority: 
“And even worse is the interpretation by the majority that the Convention "implies 
a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the community and 
the respect due to fundamental human rights".  I strongly disagree with this 
interpretation.  In my opinion it carries the Court into the very middle of the 
internal political questions of each Member State, which it has never been the 
intention that the Court should deal with.”12 
 
Hence, we learn that judicial recognition of an implicit balancing principle in the 
Convention was controversial from its inception. We shall have to consider whether 
Judge Wold’s fear that the application of the principle would encourage the Court to 
transgress beyond its jurisdiction into political decision-making has occurred when we 
have examined the later jurisprudence. 
 
                                           
8  Article 14. 
9 Article 2 of Protocol No 1.   
10 Such as married women choosing the surname they wished to be known by: Unal 
Tekeli v Turkey, Judgment of 16 November 2004, 42 EHRR 53. 
11 For the mass interception of voice and email communications: Liberty and Others v 
UK, 1 July 2008, 48 EHRR 1.  
12 Supra n.7 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Terje Wold at p. 101. 
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 The original Court later substituted the language of a “fair balance” for that of a 
“just balance”. In Sporrong and Lonroth v Sweden13 the applicant landowners had been 
subject to zonal expropriation permits and orders prohibiting construction on their land 
for many years. Eventually, the measures were rescinded when the local authority 
abandoned its planned developments. However, the applicants contended that the 
measures had interfered with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property14. 
The plenary Court held that: 
“For the purposes of the latter provision, the Court must determine whether a fair 
balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see, 
mutatis mutandis, the judgment of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian Linguistic" case, 
Series A no. 6, p. 32, par. 5).  The search for this balance is inherent in the whole 
of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1-1). 
 
The Agent of the Government recognised the need for such a balance. At the 
hearing on” the morning of 23 February 1982, he pointed out that, under the 
Expropriation Act, an expropriation permit must not be issued if the public purpose 
in question can be achieved in a different way; when this is being assessed, full 
weight must be given both to the interests of the individual and to the public 
interest. 
 
The Court has not overlooked this concern on the part of the legislature.  
Moreover, it finds it natural that, in an area as complex and difficult as that of the 
development of large cities, the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in order to implement their town-planning policy.  Nevertheless, the 
Court cannot fail to exercise its power of review and must determine whether the 
requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicants' right 
to "the peaceful enjoyment of [their] possessions", within the meaning of the first 
sentence of Article 1 (P1-1).”15 
 
A bare majority of the Court (ten votes to nine) went on to find a breach as the 
applicants had born an “excessive burden” in respect of the interferences with their 
                                           
13 A.52 (1982), 5 EHRR 35. 
14 Article 1 of Protocol No 1. 
15 Supra n.13 at para. 69. 
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properties (for up to twenty-five years) that “upset the fair balance which should be 
struck between the protection of the right of property and the requirements of the 
general interest”.16   
 Frustratingly for us the Court did not explain why it had altered the language of 
the just/fair balance principle. But we did learn that the “structure of” Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1 (P1-1) provides a specific foundation for the fair balance principle. Whilst 
the text of P1-1 does not mention “fair balance” the Article expressly refers to allowing 
the deprivation of a person’s possessions “in the public interest” and permitting States to 
control the use of property “in accordance with the general interest”. Thereby requiring 
States, and the Court when faced with a complaint under P1-1, to reconcile the property 
owner’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his/her possessions and arguments that 
community interests must prevail over the former. 
 The full-time Court has followed its predecessor’s approach and in Jahn and 
others v Germany17, the Grand Chamber, after citing paragraph 69 of the judgment in 
Sporrong and Lonnroth, confirmed that the deprivation of a person’s possessions under 
the second sentence of P1-1 was subject to the fair balance principle. An important 
aspect of this assessment required that “there must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any 
measure depriving a person of his possessions...”18 The payment of appropriate 
compensation by the relevant State was a further key component in satisfying the fair 
balance principle. 
                                           
16 Ibid.  at para. 73. 
17 Judgment of 30 June 2005, 42 EHRR 49. 
18 Ibid. at para. 93. 
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“Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment 
whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance and, notably, 
whether it imposes a disproportionate burden on the applicants. In this connection, 
the Court has already found that the taking of property without payment of an 
amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate 
interference and a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable under 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in exceptional circumstances...”19 
The majority (eleven Judges) of the Grand Chamber, reversing the earlier unanimous 
Chamber judgment20, concluded that the legislative removal, by the Federal German 
Parliament, of the applicants’ claims to agricultural land derived from an Act passed by 
the (former) “German Democratic Parliament” in 1990 did not breach P1-1. Even though 
the Federal legislation provided no compensation to the applicants the majority held that 
this was an exceptional situation. The applicants’ claims were based upon a law enacted 
by a parliament that had not been democratically elected during the transition to a 
unified Germany. 
“Having regard to all the foregoing considerations and taking account, in particular, 
of the uncertainty of the legal position of heirs and the grounds of social justice 
relied on by the German authorities, the Court concludes that in the unique context 
of German reunification, the lack of any compensation does not upset the “fair 
balance” which has to be struck between the protection of property and the 
requirements of the general interest.”21 
 Other Articles of the Convention have also been found to embody the fair balance 
principle by the full-time Court. For example, in Slivenko v Latvia22, the mother and 
daughter applicants complained of breaches of their rights to respect for their private 
lives and home, under Article 8, through their forced removal from Latvia as part of the 
agreed withdrawal of former UUSR military personnel and their families following the 
                                           
19 Ibid.at para. 94. 
20 Judgment of 22 January 2004. 
21 Supra n.17 at para. 117. 
22 Judgment of 9 October 2003, 39 EHRR 24. 
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collapse of the USSR. The respondent government contended that the action taken 
against the daughter and granddaughter of a former USSR military officer based in 
Latvia was justified under Article 8(2) as being necessary to protect Latvian national 
security. The Grand Chamber held that: 
“A measure interfering with rights guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the Convention can 
be regarded as being “necessary in a democratic society” if it has been taken in 
order to respond to a pressing social need and if the means employed are 
proportionate to the aims pursued. The national authorities enjoy a certain margin 
of appreciation in this matter. The Court's task consists in ascertaining whether the 
impugned measures struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, namely 
the individual's rights protected by the Convention on the one hand and the 
community's interests on the other.”23 
 
A majority of the Court (eleven votes) determined that the removal of the applicants did 
not strike a fair balance because they had been integrated into Latvian society and their 
relationship to a former USSR military officer did not pose a real danger to Latvian 
security. This was a significant judgment for its protection of the rights of individuals 
belonging to a minority in a newly emerging democracy. 
 From the above cases we have discovered that the principle of fair balance has 
ancient roots in the jurisprudence of the Court. Both the original and full-time Courts 
have traced the foundations of the principle to the nature of the Convention as a whole 
and to the requirements of specific Articles. Therefore, in the next section we shall 
examine how widespread the application of the principle is across the different rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. 
 
The range of Articles subject to the fair balance principle 
                                           
23 Ibid. at para. 113. 
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The full-time Court has applied the fair balance principle when considering the right to 
life24 of foetuses. In Boso v Italy25, the applicant complained, inter alia, that Italian 
legislation violated Article 2 in that it had permitted his wife to have an abortion against 
his wishes. The Court ruled that it was not required to determine if a foetus fell within 
the protection of the first sentence of Article 226, but if a foetus was to have rights 
safeguarded by Article 2: 
“the Court notes that the relevant Italian legislation authorises abortion within the 
first twelve weeks of a pregnancy if there is a risk to the woman’s physical or 
mental health. Beyond that point, an abortion may be carried out only where 
continuation of the pregnancy or childbirth would put the woman’s life at risk, or 
where it has been established that the child will be born with a condition of such 
gravity as to endanger the woman’s physical or mental health. It follows that an 
abortion may be carried out to protect the woman’s health.  
In the Court’s opinion, such provisions strike a fair balance between, on the one 
hand, the need to ensure protection of the foetus and, on the other, the woman’s 
interests. Having regard to the conditions required for the termination of pregnancy 
and to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court does not find that the 
respondent State has gone beyond its discretion in such a sensitive area (see H. v. 
Norway, no. 17004/90, Commission decision of 19 May 1992, DR 73, p. 155).”27 
 
Therefore, the Court determined that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-
founded. 
 Subsequently, the Grand Chamber in Vo v France28, after citing the fair balance 
extract from Boso, stated that: 
“It follows from this recapitulation of the case-law that in the circumstances 
examined to date by the Convention institutions – that is, in the various laws on 
                                           
24 Article 2 of the ECHR. 
25 ECHR 2002- VII. 
26 “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” (my emphasis). 
27 Supra n.25, The Law para. 1. 
28 Judgment of 8 July 2004, 40 EHRR 12, and see A. Plomer, “A Foetal Right to Life? The 
Case of Vo v France” 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 311 (2005). 
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abortion – the unborn child is not regarded as a “person” directly protected by 
Article 2 of the Convention and that if the unborn do have a “right” to “life”, it is 
implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests.”29 
 
As there was still no consensus amongst the member States regarding the status of the  
embryo/foetus, the Grand Chamber concluded that it was neither desirable or possible to 
rule in the abstract whether an unborn child was a person for the purposes of Article 2. 
However, the majority, fourteen votes to three, determined that French civil law 
provided sufficient protection for the applicant’s deceased six-month-old foetus in 
respect of the medical negligence that had necessitated the unwanted termination of the 
applicant’s pregnancy. Therefore, no breach of Article 2 had occurred. 
 From the above cases we learn that even the most basic of all Convention rights 
can be subject to a fair balance analysis. Given the potential conflict between the 
interests of a pregnant woman and her unborn foetus/child the Court has assessed 
whether domestic legislation authorising abortions has achieved a fair balance between 
those interests. Furthermore, against the background of  the strong religious, ethical and 
social values offering competing views as to how this balance should be drawn in 
different States the Court has been extremely circumspect in defining the precise rights 
of the unborn. 
 The application of the fair balance principle to Article 3 of the Convention has 
caused controversy amongst both the member States and the judges of the Court. As 
the Article contains no express limitations the original Court refused to permit a member 
State to balance the alleged threat to its national security posed by the continued 
presence of a foreign national on its territory against the risks that person would suffer 
                                           
29 Ibid at para. 80. 
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serious mal-treatment if returned to his home State in Chahal v UK30. The applicant, an 
Indian national who had been permitted to remain in the UK after entering illegally, was 
detained pending deportation on national security grounds (he was believed to be linked 
to Sikh terrorism). He contended that he would face a real risk of treatment violating 
Article 3 if returned to India due to his notoriety and the violence connected to events in 
the Punjab. Before the Court, the British government argued that Chahal’s alleged threat 
to British national security should be taken into account when evaluating if Article 3 
would be breached if he was to be deported. The Court held that: 
“79. Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic 
society... The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in 
modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, 
even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s 
conduct. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols 
Nos 1 and 4, Article 3 make no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it 
is permissible under Article 15 even in the event of a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation... 
80. The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in 
expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the 
Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the 
event of expulsion... In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in 
question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material 
consideration...”31 
Applying this approach a majority of the Court (twelve votes to seven) concluded that 
the UK would breach Article 3 if the applicant was to be deported.  
In the post 9/11 era British legislative attempts to comply with Chahal whilst also 
protecting the UK population from resident foreign nationals who were alleged to have 
                                           
30 (1997) 23 EHRR 413. 
31 Ibid. paras 79-80. 
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terrorist links generated considerable national32 and Strasbourg33 litigation. Other 
member States faced similar challenges and the full-time Court was asked to reconsider 
its Chahal approach in Saadi v Italy34. The Tunisian applicant had been convicted in Italy 
of criminal conspiracy in 2005. The criminal court order his deportation after he had 
served his prison sentence. He was also convicted by a military court in Tunisia, whilst 
detained in Italy, of membership of a terrorist organisation and sentenced to twenty 
years’ imprisonment. After his release in Italy the Minister of the Interior, exercising 
anti-terrorism powers, ordered the applicant’s deportation to Tunisia. The applicant 
claimed, at Strasbourg, that he faced a real risk of serious mal-treatment if he was to be 
deported. The British government intervened in the Grand Chamber proceedings35 
arguing that the rigid application of Chahal “had caused many difficulties for the 
Contracting States by preventing them in practice from enforcing expulsion measures.”36 
The government considered that Chahal was contrary to the intentions of the framers of 
the Convention; and that the Court should now alter and clarify its approach to, inter 
alia, allow the threat posed by the foreign national to the host member State to be 
examined. According to the government the new test ought to take “into  consideration 
all the particular circumstances of each case and weigh the rights secured to the 
applicant by Article 3 of the Convention against those secured to all other members of 
                                           
32 e.g. A. v Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56 and Home Secretary v JJ [2007] UKHL 45. 
33 e.g. A. and others v UK, Judgment of 19 February 2009, 49 EHRR 29. 
34 Judgment of 28 February 2008,  see also D. Moeckli, “Saadi v Italy: The Rules of the 
Game Have Not Changed” 8(3) Human Rights Law Review 534 (2008). 
35 Under Article 36(2) of the ECHR. 
36 Supra n.34 at para. 117. 
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the community by Article 2.”37 The Italian government also supported this proposal. The 
unanimous Grand Chamber noted: 
“first of all that States face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their 
communities from terrorist violence... It cannot therefore underestimate the scale 
of the danger of terrorism today and the threat it presents to the community. That 
must not, however, call into question the absolute nature of Article 3. 
138. Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the argument of the United Kingdom 
Government, supported by the respondent Government, that a distinction must be 
drawn under Article 3 between treatment inflicted directly by a signatory State and 
treatment that might be inflicted by the authorities of another State, and that 
protection against this latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the 
interests of the community as a whole (see paragraphs 120 and 122 above). Since 
protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision 
imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving 
country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the Court 
has repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule (see the case-law 
cited in paragraph 130 above). It must therefore reaffirm the principle stated in the 
Chahal judgment (cited above, § 81) that it is not possible to weigh the risk of ill-
treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in order to determine 
whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under Article 3, even where such 
treatment is inflicted by another State. In that connection, the conduct of the 
person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into 
account...”38  
The Grand Chamber concluded that, having regard to reports of NGOs and the US State 
Department, the applicant had established substantial grounds for believing that if he 
was to be deported to Tunisia he would face a real risk of mal-treatment violating Article 
3. No adequate diplomatic assurances of safeguards to protect the applicant had been 
given by Tunisia, therefore if Italy was to deport him to that country it would breach 
Article 3. 
 So despite the increased risks that member States face from international 
terrorism the full-time Court has continued its predecessor’s refusal to countenance the 
application of a balancing test to the deportation/extradition of suspected terrorists and 
their associates. In maintaining its Chahal approach the Grand Chamber in Saadi 
                                           
37 Ibid. at para. 122. 
38 Ibid. at paras 137-138. 
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observed that the Committee of Ministers’ (reflecting the political will of the member 
States) had adopted Guidelines39 affirming the absolute prohibition of Article 3 mal-
treatment in the fight against terrorism.40 However, indications that a number of these 
States had co-operated with the Bush administration’s “extraordinary rendition” 
programme  suggests that actual behaviour did not necessarily accord with the member 
States’ declarations or Convention obligations.41 
 Yet in the context of deportations of foreigners suffering from serious illnesses 
the full-time Court has applied the fair balance principle. In D. v UK42 the original Court 
found that it would amount to inhuman treatment for the UK to deport a person in the 
terminal stages of AIDS to his home State, St Kitts, where he had no-one to care for him 
and expensive drugs were not available to him. Subsequently other member States 
faced similar health related challenges to their deportation decisions at Strasbourg. A 
Grand Chamber reconsidered the issue in N. v UK43, where the applicant was a Ugandan 
national who entered the UK in 1998. She was seriously ill and on admision to hospital 
was diagnosed as being HIV positive. A little later she developed two AIDS defining 
illnesses. She was given extensive antiretroviral treatments and her condition stabilised. 
Her claim for asylum was rejected in 2001, but she challenged her deportation arguing, 
on the basis of D. v UK, that it would violate Article 3 as the necessary drugs for her 
                                           
39 On 11 July 2002: 804th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
40 Supra n. 34 at para. 138. 
41 See, A. Mowbray, Cases & Materials on the ECHR 2nd ed, (Oxford: OUP, 2007) at 
pp.253-255. On 21 August 2009, Dick Marty (the rapporteur of the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly on secret detentions reported that his sources seemed to 
confirm that Lithuania, as well as Poland and Romania, had hosted a secret CIA prison. 
42 (1997) 24 EHRR 423. 
43 Judgment of 27 May 2008, 47 EHRR 39. 
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continued treatment were in limited supply and expensive in Uganda. Eventually, the 
House of Lords rejected her appeal noting that it was doubtful if the member States of 
the Convention had intended it to apply in a manner requiring them to provide 
continuing medical care to the many persons in a similar predicament to the applicant. 
Before the Grand Chamber the government submitted that Article 3 only applied to 
deportations being challenged on medical grounds in exceptional circumstances and here 
the applicant was not in the terminal stages of her illness as D. had been. The Grand 
Chamber held that: 
“Although many of the rights it contains have implications of a social or economic 
nature, the Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political 
rights (Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, § 26). 
Furthermore, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see Soering 
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, § 89). 
Advances in medical science, together with social and economic differences 
between countries, entail that the level of treatment available in the Contracting 
State and the country of origin may vary considerably. While it is necessary, given 
the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention system, for the Court to 
retain a degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases, 
Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such 
disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens 
without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the contrary would place 
too great a burden on the Contracting States.244 
 
A majority (fourteen votes to three) concluded that as the applicant was not critically ill 
at that time her case could be distinguished from D. and there would be no breach of 
Article 3 if she was to be deported back to Uganda.  The dissentients “strongly 
disagreed” with the majority’s application of the fair balance principle to Article 3. 
“Even though certain “proportionalist errings”, severely criticised in legal writings, 
existed at one time, particularly in the case-law of the old Commission45, the 
                                           
44 Ibid. at para. 44. 
45 (original footnote) S. van Drooghenbroeck, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la 
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Prendre l’idée simple au sérieux, 
(Brussels : Bruylant, Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 2001), pp. 125 
et s. 
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balancing exercise in the context of Article 3 was clearly rejected by the Court in its 
recent Saadi v. Italy judgment of 28 February 200846, confirming the Chahal 
judgment of 15 November 199647...”48 
 
 We can hypothesize that the Grand Chamber in N. was willing to apply the fair 
balance principle to Article 3 due to the substance of the applicant’s claim, which in 
effect was to be allowed to remain in the UK to receive ongoing medical care, as it 
involved difficult issues of public expenditure. Furthermore, the provision of health care 
is not a right that is expressly contained in the Convention49, therefore States may 
legitimately claim the need to balance the allocation of public resources and the 
economic claims of individuals. As the Court noted in N.: 
“The United Kingdom authorities have provided the applicant with medical and 
social assistance at public expense during the nine-year period it has taken for her 
asylum application and claims under Article 3 and 8 of the Convention to be 
determined by the domestic courts and this Court. However, this does not in itself 
entail a duty on the part of the respondent State to continue to provide for her.”50 
 
 The Court has also expressed apparently divergent views on the application of the 
fair balance principle to Article 5(1), the right to liberty and security. In A. and others v 
UK51, eleven foreign nationals who had been detained under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
                                           
46 (original footnote) Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, 28 February 2008. 
47 (original footnote) Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V. 
 
48 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann at para. 7. 
49 The provision of some medical services may be derived from implied positive 
obligations arising under the Convention see, A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive 
Obligations under the ECHR by the ECtHR, (Oxford: Hart, 2004) at p.22. 
50 Supra n.43 at para. 49. 
51 Supra n.33. 
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and Security Act 2001, as the Home Secretary suspected them of being international 
terrorists and a risk to British national security but who (following Chahal) could not be 
deported back to their home States, challenged the lawfulness of their treatment under 
the Convention. The, unanimous Grand Chamber, held that 
“The Court does not accept the Government's argument that Article 5 § 1 permits a 
balance to be struck between the individual's right to liberty and the State's 
interest in protecting its population from terrorist threat. This argument is 
inconsistent not only with the Court's jurisprudence under sub-paragraph (f) but 
also with the principle that paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to an exhaustive list of 
exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions is compatible 
with the aims of Article 5. If detention does not fit within the confines of the 
paragraphs as interpreted by the Court, it cannot be made to fit by an appeal to 
the need to balance the interests of the State against those of the detainee.”52 
Whilst not explicitly referring to a fair balance the Grand Chamber’s language replicates 
the essence of the principle. The Court agreed with the House of Lords53 that the 
derogation measures taken against the applicants were disproportionate, as they only 
applied to suspected terrorists who were foreign nationals, consequently Article 5(1) had 
been breached in respect of those applicants who had not voluntarily left the UK. Yet, in 
the earlier Ocalan v Turkey54 judgment another Grand Chamber of the full-time Court 
had stated that: 
“Inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights. As movement about the world 
becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is 
increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad 
should be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for 
                                           
52 Ibid. at para. 171. 
53 Supra n.32. 
54 Judgment of 12 May 2005, 41 EHRR 45. 
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fugitives would not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the 
protected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of extradition...”55 
The Grand Chamber then went on to determine that the highly controversial arrest of the 
applicant, leader of a terrorist organisation, by Turkish officials at Nairobi airport did not 
violate Article 5(1). Although the respondent States conduct was of different forms in 
these cases it seems difficult to reconcile the blanket rejection of the application of the 
elements of the fair balance principle to Article 5(1), including its use to interpret the  
scope of the enumerated exceptions, in A. and others with its express invocation by the 
Grand Chamber in Ocalan. 
 The original Court in its plenary judgment concerning Article 5 in Brogan and 
others v UK56 acknowledged the need for a “proper balance” in the response to terrorism 
by member States. 
“The Court, having taken notice of the growth of terrorism in modern society, has 
already recognised the need, inherent in the Convention system, for a proper 
balance between the defence of the institutions of democracy in the common 
interest and the protection of individual rights...”57 
 
When analysing whether the applicants, suspected terrorists, had been brought before a 
judge/released from detention promptly, as required by Article 5(3), the majority 
(twelve votes to seven) concluded that whilst the terrorist context justified the 
authorities detaining the applicants longer than other types of suspects none of the 
applicants had been released promptly. However, Judge Martens in his dissent expressed 
the view that: 
                                           
55 Ibid. at para. 88. 
56 A.145 (1988). 11 EHRR 117. 
57 Ibid. at para. 48. 
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“Striking a fair balance between the interests of the community that suffers from 
terrorism and those of the individual is particularly difficult and national authorities, 
who from long and painful experience have acquired a far better insight into the 
requirements of effectively combating terrorism and of protecting their citizens 
than an international judge can ever hope to acquire from print, are in principle in 
a better position to do so than that judge!”58 
Given the scale of the terrorism concerning Northern Ireland, the democratic tradition of 
the UK and the annual reviews of the anti-terrorism legislation he concluded that the 
maximum length of police detention authorised (seven days) did not breach Article 5(3). 
So even when the Court has recognised the need to apply the fair balance principle to 
Article 5 complaints how the balance is to be assessed according to the particular facts of 
the case may be a matter of dispute amongst the judges. 
 The full-time Court has applied the fair balance principle to Article 6 (the right to 
a fair trial). In Nikitin v Russia59, the applicant complained that a few weeks after his 
acquittal of serious charges, including treason, the Procurator-General requested the 
Presidium of the Supreme Court to review the case in supervisory proceedings. The 
Supreme Court dismissed the request as the defects in the trial proceedings were the 
fault of the prosecution. In his complaint to Strasbourg the applicant, inter alia, 
contended that the undertaking of the supervisory review after his acquittal amounted to 
a breach of Article 6(1). The unanimous Court reasoned that as Article 4(2) of Protocol 
No 7 expressly permitted the reopening of criminal proceedings in defined 
circumstances, e.g. where evidence of new facts has emerged, and the Committee of 
Ministers had asked States to establish mechanisms to allow the reopening of criminal 
cases where the Court had found a breach of Article 6 in the original domestic 
                                           
58 Ibid. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Martens at para. 12. 
59 Judgment of 20 July 2004, 41 EHRR 10. 
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proceedings, the possibility of re-opening a criminal case was not per se incompatible 
with Article 6. 
“However, certain special circumstances of the case may reveal that the actual 
manner in which it was used impaired the very essence of a fair trial. In particular, 
the Court has to assess whether, in a given case, the power to launch and conduct 
a supervisory review was exercised by the authorities so as to strike, to the 
maximum extent possible, a fair balance between the interests of the individual 
and the need to ensure the effectiveness of the system of criminal justice.”60 
 
Here the Presidium had only examined the preliminary issue of whether to reopen the 
case against the applicant (if it had decided to authorise a reopening then new 
adversarial proceedings would have been held), therefore the Court concluded that the 
Presidium had not failed  “to strike a fair balance between the interests of the applicant 
and the need to ensure the proper administration of justice.”61 Hence the Court was 
utilising the fair balance principle to check that acquitted defendants did not suffer undue 
burdens whilst criminal justice systems maintained the opportunity to exceptionally 
reopen proceedings in order to correct injustices.  
 The fair balance principle has been utilised extensively by the Court when 
applying Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) across a diverse range of 
situations. Examples include the need for States to provide full legal recognition of the 
new personalities of post-operative transsexuals elaborated by the Grand Chamber in 
Christine Goodwin v UK62, where it was held that: 
“...the respondent Government can no longer claim that the matter falls within 
their margin of appreciation, save as regards the appropriate means of achieving 
recognition of the right protected under the Convention. Since there are no 
significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of this individual 
                                           
60 Ibid. at para. 57. 
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62 Judgment of 11 July 2002, 35 EHRR 18. 
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applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender re-assignment, it reaches the 
conclusion that the fair balance that is inherent in the Convention now tilts 
decisively in favour of the applicant. There has, accordingly, been a failure to 
respect her right to private life in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.”63 
 
Through to assessing whether States have provided adequate protection to homes from 
serious pollution as in the Heathrow night flights case of Hatton and others v UK64.  The 
Grand Chamber, by twelve votes to five, found no breach of Article 8 due to the detailed 
controls over night flights using the airport. 
“In these circumstances the Court does not find that, in substance, the authorities 
overstepped their margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between 
the right of the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private 
life and home, and the conflicting interests of others and of the community as a 
whole, nor does it find that there have been fundamental procedural flaws in the 
preparation of the 1993 regulations on limitations for night flights.”65 
 
We should not be surprised at the variety of Article 8 cases invoking the fair balance 
principle given the breadth of the rights protected by this provision66. Furthermore, as 
we have seen already in Slivenko67, the structure of Article 8 enables States  to argue 
that interferences with Article 8(1) rights are justified for legitimate community interests 
under Article 8(2) and this encourages the Court to apply the fair balance principle to 
assess the disputed equilibriums reached by States. 
 Under Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) the full-time Court 
has applied the fair balance principle to evaluate whether public authorities have 
                                           
63 Ibid. at para. 93. 
64 Judgment of 8 July 2003, 37 EHRR 28. 
65 Ibid. at para. 129. 
66 See supra n.41 at Ch.10. 
67 Supra n.22. 
21 
 
unjustifiably intervened in the internal disputes of a religious organisation. The complex 
background to Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
(Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria68, concerned a split in the Bulgarian Christian 
Orthodox Church after the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989. The applicants 
established a new leadership, known as the alternative Synod, as they believed that the 
Patriarch who had been appointed under the Communists had been proclaimed in breach 
of the Church’s traditional canons. In subsequent years the rival groups within the 
Church were linked with different political parties. A new government, in 2002, 
announced its support for the Patriarch and legislation was passed which denied access 
to church assets to those who split from such an organisation.  Following a complaint by 
the Patriarch, public prosecutors  issued orders for the removal of the applicants and 
their supporters from Church buildings, resulting in over 50 evictions by the police. The 
applicants brought an action at Strasbourg alleging, inter alia, a breach of Article 9 as 
the authorities had arbitrarily intervened in the dispute within the Church favouring the 
established Patriarch. The unanimous Court ruled that: 
“The issue before the Court is, however, whether the concrete measures chosen by 
the authorities could be accepted as lawful and necessary in a democratic society 
and, in particular, whether those measures were proportionate and struck a fair 
balance between the declared aim of securing legality and the rights of the 
individuals and organisations concerned.”69 
 
In the judgment of the Court the extensive intervention by the government in the affairs 
of the Church with the objective of forcing the membership to support the leadership 
endorsed by the authorities was disproportionate and violated the applicants’ rights 
under Article 9. It is a well-established aspect of the Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence that 
public authorities must not seek to impose their preferred leaderships on divided 
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religious organisations. Indeed, two earlier judgments had found different Bulgarian 
governments to have unlawfully interfered in analogous disputes within the Bulgarian 
Muslim community.70 
 Both the original and full-time Courts have applied the fair balance principle in 
cases involving Article 10 (freedom of expression). In Vogt v Germany71, the issue for 
the former was whether the dismissal of a school teacher, who had the status of a civil 
servant, because she engaged in electoral activities on behalf of the Communist Party 
violated her right to political expression. The  German courts had determined that civil 
servants who actively supported the Communist Party were in breach of their duty of 
loyalty to the state, due to their endorsement of the Party’s anti-constitutional 
objectives. The Court held that: 
“Although it is legitimate for a State to impose on civil servants, on account of their 
status, a duty of discretion, civil servants are individuals and, as such, qualify for 
the protection of Article 10 of the Convention.  It therefore falls to the Court, 
having regard to the circumstances of each case, to determine whether a fair 
balance has been struck between the fundamental right of the individual to 
freedom of expression and the legitimate interest of a democratic State in ensuring 
that its civil service properly furthers the purposes enumerated in Article 10 para. 
2.  In carrying out this review, the Court will bear in mind that whenever civil 
servants' right to freedom of expression is in issue the "duties and responsibilities" 
referred to in Article 10 para. 2 assume a special significance, which justifies 
leaving to the national authorities a certain margin of appreciation in determining 
whether the impugned interference is proportionate to the above aim.”72 
  
By a bare majority of one the Grand Chamber concluded that the dismissal of the 
applicant was a disproportionate measure given her good teaching record.  
                                           
70 See Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria, (2002) 34 EHRR 55 and Supreme Holy Council of 
the Muslim Community v Bulgaria, Judgment of 16 December 2004, 41 EHRR 3. 
71 A.323 (1995), 21 EHRR 53. 
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 In Appleby and others v UK73, the full-time Court was confronted with the 
argument that  the applicants’ right to political expression had been infringed as 
domestic law accorded the private owners of a town centre shopping-complex power to 
deny the applicants permission to campaign for public support, on the future of a local 
park, in the complex. The Court considered that the applicants’ complaint involved the 
question whether the respondent State was in breach of its positive obligation to protect 
freedom of expression. 
“In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to 
the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual, the search for which is inherent 
throughout the Convention. The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having 
regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices 
which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must such an 
obligation be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities.”74 
Given that the applicants had alternative methods of campaigning, such as visiting 
residents’ homes or via the local media, a majority of the Court (six votes to one) found 
that the UK had not failed to protect the applicants’ freedom of expression. 
 As Article 10 has a similar structure to that of Article 8 we should not be surprised 
to have discovered that the Court has also applied the fair balance principle when 
evaluating if particular applicants’ freedom of expression had been violated. Likewise the 
Grand Chamber in Chassagnou and others v France75, had regard to the fair balance 
principle when assessing if the applicants’ negative right to freedom of association under 
Article 11 had been breached. French legislation obliged the owners of small pieces of 
rural land to join local hunters’ associations and permit members to hunt on their land. 
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The applicants had ethical objections to hunting, but the government claimed that the 
legislation could be justified under Article 11(2) as being necessary to enable wide public 
participation in hunting. The Grand Chamber considered that: 
“To compel a person by law to join an association such that it is fundamentally 
contrary to his own convictions to be a member of it, and to oblige him, on account 
of his membership of that association, to transfer his rights over the land he owns 
so that the association in question can attain objectives of which he disapproves, 
goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that a fair balance is struck between 
conflicting interests and cannot be considered proportionate to the aim pursued.”76 
 
Therefore, a large majority, twelve vote to five, concluded that the applicants had 
suffered a breach of Article 11. 
 We have already examined the origins of the Court’s application of the fair 
balance principle in the context of complaints alleging discriminatory treatment violating 
Article 14 and a connected substantive Convention right.77 In more recent times the 
Court has stated that: 
“In other words, the notion of discrimination includes in general cases where a 
person or group is treated, without proper justification, less favourably than 
another, even though the more favourable treatment is not called for by the 
Convention (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 
28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 39, § 82). Article 14 does not prohibit distinctions 
in treatment which are founded on an objective assessment of essentially different 
factual circumstances and which, being based on the public interest, strike a fair 
balance between the protection of the interests of the community and respect for 
the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention (see, among other 
authorities, G.M.B. and K.M. v. Switzerland (Dec.), no. 36797/97, 27 September 
2001).”78 
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The majority, six votes to one, found that the respondent State had not provided a 
satisfactory justification as to why men were much more likely to be obliged to 
undertake jury service than women. Hence, the male applicant had suffered a breach of 
Article 14 in association with Article 4(3)(d) (prohibition of slavery and forced labour). 
Additionally, our previous analysis of the foundations of the fair balance principle has 
disclosed the Court’s regular utilisation of the principle when determining if there has 
been an infringement of the protection of property (P1-1).79 
 Overall we have discovered that the Court has indeed applied the fair balance 
principle across the vast majority of rights safeguarded by the Convention, thereby  
confirming the accuracy of its Soering mantra80. Where it has not been applied, for 
example in respect of Article 12, this may be due to the limited amount of case law 
under those Articles. Perhaps it is to be expected that the Court’s utilisation of the 
principle has been most divisive in respect of the unqualified Article 3. However, as N. v 
UK81 disclosed, at least where the complaint has strong socio-economic overtones, the 
fair balance principle can be applied even in respect of the most absolute right 
guaranteed by the Convention.82 Conversely, where Articles expressly include limitation 
                                           
79 Supra n.13 and 17. 
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social rights see, C. Warbrick, “Economic and Social Interests and the ECHR” in 
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clauses authorising States to interfere with protected rights in order to promote 
community interests the Court has frequently resorted to the fair balance principle.83 
 
Functions performed by the fair balance principle 
We can discern from the Court’s jurisprudence at least two discrete functions being 
performed by the fair balance principle. First the principle enables the Court to assess 
the proportionality of the respondent State’s conduct.84 Several commentators have 
identified the fair balance principle as the basis for the Court undertaking a 
proportionality analysis. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi has observed that: 
“It must be recalled that under the Convention, there exist two types of 
proportionality evaluation emphasised by the Strasbourg organs. Firstly, they have 
asserted that a “fair balance” must be struck between the right of  individual 
applicants and the general interests of the public. ...The second meaning of 
proportionality is a modified and more specific version of the first and defined as a 
reasonable relationship between the means employed, including their severity and 
duration, and the public objective to be sought.”85 
Also, D.J.Harris et al. have expressed the view that in respect of the Court’s assessment 
of whether a fair balance has been attained, “[t]he achievement of such a balance 
necessarily requires an approach based, inter alia, upon considerations of 
proportionality.”86  
                                           
83 For example in complaints based upon Article 8. 
84 On the topic of proportionality  see, J. McBride, “Proportionality and the European 
Convention on Human Rights” in E. Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws 
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 A classic example of the Court analysing the proportionality of a State’s 
interference with an applicant’s Convention rights as an aspect of determining if a fair 
balance had been achieved was Hutten-Czapska v Poland87. The applicant  complained to 
the Court about the limitations, imposed by Polish legislation, on her ability to increase 
the rents payable by her tenants and restrictions on her right to terminate their 
tenancies. The government sought to justify the measures as being necessary to deal 
with the severe housing problems occurring during the transition from a communist to a 
free-market society. The Grand Chamber classified the applicant’s complaint as falling 
within the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (control of the use of a person’s 
property in accordance with the general interest). To assess whether a breach had 
occurred the Grand Chamber held that: 
“Not only must an interference with the right of property pursue, on the facts as 
well as in principle, a “legitimate aim” in the “general interest”, but there must also 
be a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realised by any measures applied by the State, including 
measures designed to control the use of the individual’s property. That 
requirement is expressed by the notion of a “fair balance” that must be struck 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. 
The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 as a whole. In each case involving an alleged violation of that Article 
the Court must therefore ascertain whether by reason of the State’s interference 
the person concerned had to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden...”88 
Unanimously, the Grand Chamber found that the Polish legislation pursued the legitimate 
aim of seeking to deal with the chronic shortage of homes. But: 
“...the Polish State, which inherited from the communist regime the acute shortage 
of flats available for lease at an affordable level of rent, had to balance the 
exceptionally difficult and socially sensitive issues involved in reconciling the 
conflicting interests of landlords and tenants. It had, on the one hand, to secure 
the protection of the property rights of the former and, on the other, to respect the 
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social rights of the latter, often vulnerable individuals. Nevertheless, the legitimate 
interests of the community in such situations call for a fair distribution of the social 
and financial burden involved in the transformation and reform of the country’s 
housing supply. This burden cannot, as in the present case, be placed on one 
particular social group, however important the interests of the other group or the 
community as a whole. 
In the light of the foregoing, and having regard to the effects of the operation of 
the rent-control legislation during the whole period under consideration on the 
rights of the applicant and other persons in a similar situation, the Court considers 
that the Polish State has failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the 
general interests of the community and the protection of the right of property.”89 
 
Consequently the applicant had suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1. Far 
more significantly the Grand Chamber ruled that the breach in the applicant’s case was 
the product of legislation which created a systemic violation affecting about 100,000 
landlords and potentially 900,000 tenants. From our perspective the Grand Chamber’s  
reasoning demonstrates the use of both types of proportionality identified by Arai-
Yakahashi. 
 The second function being performed by the fair balance principle is to provide a 
mechanism enabling the Court to determine if the respondent State is subject to an 
implied positive obligation arising under the Convention.90 A significant contemporary 
example is Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz v Switzerland (no. 2).91 As the case title 
indicates the Grand Chamber was faced with a second complaint by the applicant animal 
protection association. The association had produced a television commercial 
campaigning against the battery farming of pigs. The Swiss authorities had refused 
permission for the advertisement to be broadcast in 1997 and subsequently the 
association successfully complained to the Court alleging a breach of its right to freedom 
                                           
89 Ibid. at para. 225. 
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Development of Positive Obligations under the ECHR by the European Court of Human 
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of expression guaranteed by Article 10.92 After the Court’s ruling the association had 
again sought permission for its commercial to be broadcast on Swiss television, but the 
authorities and the Federal Court refused to authorise the transmission of the 
advertisement. Thereupon, the association lodged a second application at Strasbourg 
contending that the continuing ban on its commercial by Switzerland amounted  to a 
new violation of Article 10.  During the following year the Committee of Ministers, not 
having been informed of the Federal Court’s decision, completed its supervision of the 
execution of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment.93 When the second application reached 
the Grand Chamber it considered that the central question was: 
“...whether, in view of the importance of the execution of its judgments in the 
Convention system and the applicable principles, the respondent State had a 
positive obligation to take the necessary measures to allow the television 
commercial in issue to be broadcast following the Court’s finding of a violation of 
Article 10. In determining whether such an obligation exists, regard must be had to 
the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual.”94 
The Grand Chamber found that the advertisement was directed at matters of public 
interest (consumer health and animal/environmental protection), the Federal Court’s 
rejection of the applicant’s domestic legal challenge had been unduly formalistic and 
Article 10 protected inter alia offensive and shocking ideas so the State’s argument that 
consumers and meat traders might find the advertisement unpleasant did not justify the 
ban on its transmission.  Consequently, a large majority (eleven votes to six) determined 
that Switzerland had failed to comply with its positive obligation under Article 10. 
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 Verein clearly demonstrated the Court weighing up the applicant’s interests 
against those of the community, as submitted by the respondent State, when 
determining if the fair balance principle required the latter to undertake positive 
measures to fulfil the former’s Convention rights. It is very rare for the Court to uphold a 
complaint alleging a breach of a positive obligation under Article 10.95 However, given 
the continued refusal of the Swiss authorities to permit the broadcasting of the 
advertisement, despite the Court’s judgment in the first case, the Grand Chamber 
evidently believed that this was a situation which required affirmative action by the 
respondent State. 
 
The identification of competing interests 
From the jurisprudence we can discern a very diverse range of competing interests 
which the Court has taken cognisance of when applying the fair balance principle. For 
instance in Boso96 the Court had regard to the protection of the foetus and the mother’s 
physical and mental health when evaluating Italian legislation regulating abortions. The 
interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flea abroad should be brought to 
justice balanced against the liberty of such fugitives was at the heart of the Court’s 
analysis in Ocalan97.  The liberty of suspected terrorists was also weighed-up against the 
protection of democratic institutions in Brogan98. Another aspect of the criminal justice 
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system was subject to the fair balance analysis in Nikitin99 where the Court assessed the 
general interest of, exceptionally, allowing the re-opening of criminal trials against the 
opposition of the acquitted defendant. The needs of users and providers of night-time  
aircraft flights together with the related economic benefits to the whole of the country 
were balanced against the consequent disturbance to persons affected by the noise of 
the aeroplanes in Hatton100. The objective of public authorities securing “legality” in the 
leadership and internal affairs of a religious organisation compared with the rights of a 
break-away group of believers were at the heart of the Court’s analysis in Holy Synod101. 
The conflict between an individual civil servant’s freedom of political expression and the 
interests of a democratic State in ensuring that its public service promotes the 
community interests specified in Article 10(2) (including safeguarding national security) 
were subjected to the fair balance principle in Vogt102. 
 From these examples it is possible to conclude that the broad spectrum of 
competing interests that the Court has had to balance are a product of both the breadth 
of the rights secured under the Convention and the heterogeneous factual contexts in 
which applicants contend their rights have been infringed. It is also worth noting that the 
respondent States have quite often relied upon rather general assertions of community 
interests, including promoting national economic well-being and controlling the 
behaviour of civil servants. Such justifications maybe a reflection of the language used 
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by the Convention to elaborate the limitations to qualified Convention rights like Article 
8. 
 
Other factors considered by the Court when applying the fair balance principle 
Alongside the interests of the applicant and the community (being advanced by the 
respondent State), the Court has also taken account of other factors when utilising the 
fair balance principle. In Broniowski v Poland103 the applicant complained that he had 
suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 due to the failure of the Polish 
authorities to provide him with the compensation he was entitled to under domestic law 
in respect of a home his family had been forced to abandon as a consequence of the re-
drawing of the eastern borders of Poland at the end of the Second World War. The Grand 
Chamber acknowledged that this application was the first of many raising the same 
complaint before the Court104 and even more individuals were in a similar position. 
Therefore: 
“[t]he vast number of persons involved – nearly 80,000 – and the very substantial 
value of their claims [over 13 billion Polish zlotys] are certainly factors that must 
be taken into account in ascertaining whether the requisite “fair balance” was 
struck.”105 
In addition the Grand Chamber recognised that the respondent State was seeking to 
manage the country’s reforms in a post-communist society. 
“Balancing the rights at stake, as well as the gains and losses of the different 
persons affected by the process of transforming the State's economy and legal 
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system, is an exceptionally difficult exercise. In such circumstances, in the nature 
of things, a wide margin of appreciation should be accorded to the respondent 
State.  
Nevertheless, the Court would reiterate that that margin, however considerable, is 
not unlimited and that the exercise of the State's discretion, even in the context of 
the most complex reform of the State, cannot entail consequences at variance with 
Convention standards.”106 
Given that the applicant had received less than two percent of the compensation due to 
him the Court, unanimously, concluded that he had born a disproportionate burden 
which could not be justified in terms of the general community interest. So even when a 
broad margin of appreciation had been accorded to the State, because of the scale of the 
financial and social problems it faced, a fair balance had not been achieved by the 
domestic legal order. 
 The Court has also been willing to consider any negative aspects of the conduct of 
the applicant or the respondent State when applying the fair balance principle. For 
example, in Beyeler v Italy107 the applicant Swiss art dealer/patron had bought a Van 
Gogh painting in Italy during 1977, through an agent, without informing the authorities 
that he was the owner as required by national law. In 1983 he notified the authorities of 
his ownership as a prelude to selling the painting. Five years later the authorities 
purported to exercise a statutory right to buy the painting at its 1977 value, after the 
applicant had just agreed to sell it for the much higher price of 8.5 million dollars to a 
private foundation. The applicant contended that the authorities’ action constituted a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1. In applying the fair balance principle the Grand 
Chamber held that: 
“...In the context of the general rule enunciated in the first sentence of the first 
paragraph of Article 1, ascertaining whether such a balance existed requires an 
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overall examination of the various interests in issue, which may call for an analysis 
not only of the compensation terms – if the situation is akin to the taking of 
property (see, for example, the Lithgow and Others [v UK] judgment [A.102 
(1986)] §§ 120-121) – but also, as in the instant case, of the conduct of the 
parties to the dispute, including the means employed by the State and their 
implementation.”108 
 
The Grand Chamber found that the applicant had deliberately not informed the 
authorities of his purchase for six years, in order to avoid the possibility of a statutory 
purchase by them. Consequently, the Court accepted that there was “some weight” to 
the respondent State’s claim that Beyeler had “not acted openly and honestly”.109  
However, the Grand Chamber was also critical of the State’s behaviour in not seeking to 
purchase the painting for five years: 
“That state of affairs allowed the Ministry of Cultural Heritage to acquire the 
painting in 1988 at well below its market value. Having regard to the conduct of 
the authorities between December 1983 and November 1988, the Court considers 
that they derived an unjust enrichment from the uncertainty that existed during 
that period and to which they had largely contributed. Irrespective of the 
applicant's nationality, such enrichment is incompatible with the requirement of a 
“fair balance”.”110 
 
Therefore, by sixteen votes to one, the Grand Chamber found a violation as the applicant 
had been subject to a disproportionate burden by the actions of the Italian authorities. 
Judge Ferrari Bravo observed in his dissent that he had “serious doubts as to the moral 
basis for the arguments advanced by both parties to the dispute.”111 So it is clear that 
the Grand Chamber was united in its willingness to take account of reprehensible 
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111 Ibid. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ferrari Bravo. 
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conduct by parties to proceedings when assessing whether a fair balance had been 
achieved between the interests of the applicant and the community. 
 Another factor which we have regularly encountered the Court taking cognisance 
of in complaints involving the deprivation of possessions is the payment of adequate 
compensation.112 A contemporary example of this occurred in Kozacioglu v Turkey113. 
The novel issue for the Grand Chamber was whether the fair balance principle required 
States to compensate owners for the historical value of their properties when these were 
expropriated. The applicant’s building adjoined St. Paul’s Well and had been classified as 
a “cultural asset” by the relevant public authority in 1990. Ten years later the local 
council expropriated the building, as part of a regeneration scheme. A panel of experts 
assessed the value of the building, however Turkish law prevented the applicant from 
being compensated for the historical importance of his building. The Grand Chamber 
ruled that the safeguarding of a State’s cultural heritage was a legitimate aim justifying 
the expropriation of such possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No 1. Furthermore, 
States were to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in legislating when cultural 
property should be taken into public ownership. However: 
“Compensation terms under the relevant domestic legislation are material to the 
assessment whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance... 
Legitimate objectives of “public interest” may call for less than reimbursement of 
the full market value of the expropriated property... In the Court’s view, the 
protection of the historical and cultural heritage is one such objective.”114 
As Turkish law prevented any compensation being paid in respect of the historical and 
cultural value of the applicant’s building it was unfair and he had suffered a breach of 
                                           
112 See e.g. Jahn supra n. 17 and Beyeler supra n. 107. 
113 Judgment of 19 February 2009. 
114 Ibid. at para. 64. 
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Article 1. The Grand Chamber, by sixteen votes to one, determined that 75,000 euro 
pecuniary compensation should be paid. Hence whilst the Court was willing to recognise 
States’ programmes of cultural protection, where possessions are expropriated in the 
public interest appropriate levels of compensation must be paid.   
Conclusions 
From our study we have discovered that the fair balance principle is a judicial creation 
which the Court declares has its origins in the essence of the Convention where member 
States undertake to respect the fundamental rights of persons guaranteed by the ECHR 
whilst also promoting the general interests of their populations. In addition certain 
Articles, including 8-11 and Article 1 of Protocol No 1, by their qualified structures have 
provided further justification for the Court applying the principle. However, despite 
minority opposition, the Grand Chamber has even applied the principle to the unqualified 
Article 3.115 Therefore, the Court’s often repeated dictum that the principle is “inherent in 
the whole of the Convention”116 is an accurate reflection of the constantly evolving 
jurisprudence. 
 The principle has been utilised by the Court as a basis for assessing the 
proportionality of respondent States’ interferences with the Convention rights of 
applicants117 and for determining when States are subject to implied positive obligations 
under the Convention118. Thereby demonstrating its value to the Court as a multi-
functional tool. When assessing if a fair balance has been achieved in specific cases the 
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Court has had to take account of a myriad of competing individual and community 
interests asserted by applicants and respondent States. Furthermore, the Court has also 
taken cognisance of additional factors, including the numbers of persons in a similar 
situation to the applicant119 and any reprehensible conduct by either or both of the 
parties120, when applying the principle. Given the difficulties of reconciling these 
conflicting interests it is perhaps not surprising therefore to sometimes find a powerful 
dissenting opinion which reaches a diametrically opposite conclusion to that of the 
majority.121 
 Recognising the challenges faced by the Court when applying the fair balance 
principle it is now appropriate to return to Judge Terje Wold’s objection to the original 
Court’s adoption of the principle. Has the subsequent jurisprudence revealed the 
principle carrying the Court  into the “very middle of the internal political questions of 
each Member State”?122  Well the cases we have examined certainly show the Court 
applying the principle to governmental decisions involving controversial topics including: 
controlling pollution123, regulating hunting124 and supervising the relations between 
private landowners and their tenants125. But the Court has also been willing to accord 
                                           
119 For example in Broniowski supra n. 103. 
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deference to national authorities, where the decisions they have taken are complex and 
subject to differing policy/political approaches, by the use of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. Whilst this article is not the place to revisit the arguments for and against the 
doctrine126, our study has encountered the Court according States a range of margins of 
appreciation. Wide margins were given to decisions, inter alia, over town planning127, 
managing the transformation of a society and its economy from a communist totalitarian 
system to a free-market democracy128 and taking cultural property into public 
ownership129. A narrower “certain” margin was accorded to States when restricting the 
political activities (during non-working hours) of their civil servants, due to the 
importance of safeguarding the democratic process.130 Whilst the margin was virtually 
abolished where a State’s treatment of a minority group was deficient compared to the 
international consensus.131 Consequently, the Court has deployed the variable margin of 
appreciation doctrine as a means of altering the intensity of its assessment of the fair 
balance achieved between community goals and the rights of applicants. Nevertheless, 
even where a wide margin has been accorded to the governmental authorities this has 
not prevented the Court from finding breaches of the applicants’ Convention rights where 
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they have suffered a disproportionate burden.132 Such an approach reflects the view of 
the majority in the Belgian Linguistic case133, who first articulated the origins of the fair 
balance principle, that protection of fundamental human rights necessitates special 
weight being accorded to it during the application of the principle.  
 Overall we can conclude that the development and use of the fair balance 
principle by the Court operates symbiotically with the responsibilities of member States 
under the Convention. As democratic societies  subject to the rule of law134 their national 
authorities need to balance community interests against the basic human rights of 
individuals. But if the latter believe that their Convention rights have been unjustifiable 
infringed the Convention, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the other 
admissibility criteria135, enables the Court to reach a determination. Our study has 
disclosed the extent and nature of the Court’s application of the fair balance principle in 
making such judgments. 
 
 
                                           
132 For example in Hutten-Czapska supra n.87. 
133 Supra n. 7. 
134 See the preamble to the Convention. 
135 Specified in Article 35 and see supra n. 41 at pp. 19-30. 
